RESTRICTED DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW Application: ARAMIS RTF Descriptor: CoveringPM: CovDescriptor: CovCaveat: Finalised: OfficialRecord: DocumentStatus: Registered CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER DocumentStyle: MINUTE/SUBMISSION ProtectiveMarking: RESTRICTED Caveat: FromInd: BLOOMFIELD K FromOrg: CTPD ToInd: MANNING ToOrg: N/A DocumentDate: 20/09/2000 RegisteredOn: 20/09/2000 SysDocumentDate: 20/09/2000 Subject: CTPD AND FORTRESS: TESTED AND FOUND WANTING Draft: ARAMIS folder reference: UNF338/001/00 FolderReference: UNF338/001/2000 AdditionalText: RegisteredBy: und13 DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE STARTDOCUMENT: .RE Edited by ctpd02 Date 20/09/00 Time 12:35 [.RE1][.RE2][.RE3][.RE4] From: Keith Bloomfield, CTPD Date: 20 September 2000 cc: William Ehrman Mathew Kirk, ITSU Lyn Parker, WLD Michael Ryder, DICD Tom Duggin, SSU Louise Selvadurai, UND R55, SIS A24, GCHQ To: David Manning CTPD: DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL SUMMARY 1. Twelve months on, the consensus in CTPD is that FORTRESS has proved to be slower, less reliable, less practical, but more costly than the old paper distribution of intelligence. If the system cannot be improved we would prefer to return to paper distribution. DETAIL 2. CTPD is a highly IT-literate department. We welcomed the prospect of FORTRESS - a system that (we were told) would give us quicker access to intelligence, an efficient retrieval system, the ability to create our own strap documents, and secure electronic links with the agencies. 3. Nevertheless, in the year since FORTRESS was rolled out, FCO departments have encountered substantial problems. These problems have been exacerbated for CTPD because we have attempted (but failed) to use FORTRESS not only as a mechanism to read reports but also in order to take action, particularly when the intelligence has indicated a threat to life. 4. The core problems of FORTRESS have been well documented in minutes from this department, in the WLD FORTRESS User Group, and during meetings with a succession of consultants. The problems have not been addressed. In brief, they are that: - the system is less reliable and often slower than paper distribution: there have been a number of occasions when immediate threat intelligence arrived too late in CTPD, or did not arrive at all, because of technical hitches. We still receive intelligence well after most OGDs. Vital threat telegrams to our missions overseas have been delayed as a result, causing Ambassadorial consternation (as with the pre-summer UBL threat to Brussels); - the printing constraints of the system make crisis management meetings unworkable (we prefer to have paper copies in front of us), routine "action on" impractical (it is difficult to discuss reports over BRENTs or telephones because we share terminals and cannot have reports in front of us when the call comes through), and participation in CIGs less than satisfactory (we often seem to be the only department which does not have paper copies of the relevant intelligence in front of us when we are discussing JIC assessments); - the software is not in the least user-friendly which means we waste hours every week trying to access reports. CTPD receives almost 40 reports a day. We estimate that it takes us five times as long to process reports on FORTRESS than on paper: not a very efficient use of our time; - I do not know how much the FORTRESS roll out has cost the office; I doubt that it is more cost effective than paper distribution. 5. We were promised that the core problems would be addressed. We now understand that there is no prospect that FORTRESS will be modified to meet our concerns. Faced therefore with a system which is less reliable, less practical and often slower than paper, CTPD would prefer to return to a paper distribution. 6. For separate, but no less serious, reasons FORTRESS could not be used as a replacement for the Secret capacity of ARAMIS once we have Confidential FIRECREST. Which means that, if we retain FORTRESS, we will have to work daily with three different terminals and five different retrieval packages (FORTRESS, FIRECREST, ARAMIS, paper, and BBC Media). The scope for work falling through the gaps will increase dramatically. SIS, I understand, have had one system covering all aspects of their work (CX, SIGINT, SIS t/gs, FCO t/gs, UKIMN email, BBC Media etc) for years. 7. I appreciate that the office's IT requirements are not driven by CTPD and that the Board of Management is seeking to optimise FCO systems across the board. But I felt you should be aware that, as far as we in CTPD are concerned information handling is progressively getting more, not less, difficult. Keith Bloomfield WH423 Tel: 020 7270 2581 Fax: 020 7270 3460 ************************************************* Additional Text Section ************************************************* ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und22 Action Taken: DOCUMENT COPIED FROM SLAM 19:09 Action Protective Marking: RESTRICTED Action Caveats: Action Date: 20/09/2000 ************ Actions Section Below ************** Action Officer: und22 Action Taken: DOCUMENT REGISTERED 19:09 Action Protective Marking: RESTRICTED Action Caveats: Action Date: 20/09/2000 [.RE5][.RE6] Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 17:25 Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 16:15 Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 16:05 Created by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 14:13 (C) 1996-97 Centreline 2000 TUDOR - Licensed to end user Foreign and Commonwealth Office Document Conversion Number 199702 of 1000000 licensed RESTRICTED